Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0163-4zbMath1329.91100OpenAlexW2070198814MaRDI QIDQ490945

Azar Abizada, Siwei Chen

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0163-4

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessquasi-stabilitycollege admissionseligibilityjustifiable-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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