Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0163-4MaRDI QIDQ490945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Azar Abizada, Siwei Chen

Publication date 21 August 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0163-4

zbMATH Keywords

college admissionseligibilityjustifiable-stabilityquasi-stabilitystrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Implementation of college admission rules

Cites work

• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Cited in

(7)

• Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints

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