Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
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Publication:490945
DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0163-4zbMATH Open1329.91100OpenAlexW2070198814MaRDI QIDQ490945FDOQ490945
Authors: Azar Abizada, Siwei Chen 
Publication date: 21 August 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0163-4
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Cites Work
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
Cited In (6)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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