A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
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Publication:489140
DOI10.1007/S40305-014-0049-8zbMATH Open1305.91190OpenAlexW1991145024MaRDI QIDQ489140FDOQ489140
Publication date: 27 January 2015
Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-014-0049-8
Cites Work
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- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- A Note on Roth's Consensus Property of Many-to-One Matching
Cited In (3)
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