A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:908183
DOI10.3934/jdg.2015005zbMath1391.91132OpenAlexW2527190193WikidataQ59973553 ScholiaQ59973553MaRDI QIDQ908183
Publication date: 3 February 2016
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015005
Related Items
Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
