Dynamic club formation with coordination
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Publication:908188
DOI10.3934/jdg.2015010zbMath1391.91139OpenAlexW2790489165WikidataQ59973562 ScholiaQ59973562MaRDI QIDQ908188
Tone Arnold, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 3 February 2016
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015010
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