Stability and segregation in group formation

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0878zbMATH Open1013.91010OpenAlexW2115360031MaRDI QIDQ700120FDOQ700120

Authors: Igal Milchtaich, Eyal Winter 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ea9950d0b612e479e120fc3321a54d038890decb

Recommendations

• Formation of segregated and integrated groups
• Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets
• An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation
• House exchange and residential segregation in networks
• An analysis of one-dimensional Schelling segregation

zbMATH Keywords

segregationcoalition structuregroup formationlocal public goodsweak acyclicitymyopic optimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Potential games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Clubs and the Market
• Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Cores of partitioning games
• Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
• Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Crowding games are sequentially solvable
• Policy inferences from community choice models: A caution
• The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies

Cited In (25)

• Information-sharing in social networks
• Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
• Minorities and Endogenous Segregation
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Efficiency and stability in a discrete model of country formation
• A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Formation of segregated and integrated groups
• Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An extension of Young's segregation game
• The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis
• Pricing group membership
• Group representation concerns and network formation
• Stereotype formation as trait aggregation
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• Farsighted clustering with group-size effects and reputations
• Forming \(k\) coalitions and facilitating relationships in social networks
• Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation
• Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
• Non-existence of stable social groups in information-driven networks
• Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets
• Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
• Dynamic club formation with coordination
• Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?

This page was built for publication: Stability and segregation in group formation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700120)