Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.002zbMath1150.91009OpenAlexW2239180247MaRDI QIDQ2466867

Carmen Beviá, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 16 January 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2002/55702.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconsistencygroup formationsocial choice correspondencesSimpson rulecondorcet rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks ⋮ Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities ⋮ Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Condorcet winner configurations of linear networks ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

Cites Work

• Self-selection consistent functions
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Improved complexity bounds for location problems on the real line
• Core in a simple coalition formation game

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