House exchange and residential segregation in networks

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0526-2zbMath1398.91480OpenAlexW2322118360MaRDI QIDQ521882

Yan-An Hwang, Zhiwei Cui

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0526-2

zbMATH Keywords

networksstable allocationsSchelling modelcounterpart partitioninternal cohesion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Applications of graph theory (05C90) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• The evolution of exchange.
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Kidney Exchange
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Contagion

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