House exchange and residential segregation in networks
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0526-2zbMATH Open1398.91480OpenAlexW2322118360MaRDI QIDQ521882FDOQ521882
Authors: Zhiwei Cui, Yan-An Hwang 
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0526-2
Recommendations
- The cost of segregation in (social) networks
- A Dynamic Model of Segregation in Small-World Networks
- Emergence of segregation in evolving social networks
- A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
- A spatially extended model for residential segregation
- On exchangeability in network models
- Segregation in Friendship Networks
- Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation
- Estimating within-household contact networks from egocentric data
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2247582
Applications of graph theory (05C90) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)
Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Dynamic models of segregation†
- Kidney Exchange
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- The evolution of exchange.
- Contagion
- A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
- Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: House exchange and residential segregation in networks
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q521882)
