Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation
DOI10.3934/JDG.2022006zbMATH Open1505.91287OpenAlexW2182702235MaRDI QIDQ2106063FDOQ2106063
Authors: E. Dokumaci, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022006
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evolutionary game theorystochastic stabilityBayesian gamesBayesian best response dynamicresidential segregation
Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Characterizing segregation in the schelling-voter model
- Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update
- A spatially extended model for residential segregation
- Dynamic models of segregation†
- A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
- Avalanches in an extended Schelling model: an explanation of urban gentrification
- House exchange and residential segregation in networks
- An extension of Schelling's segregation model: modeling the impact of individuals' intolerance in the presence of resource scarcity
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