Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation

DOI10.3934/JDG.2022006MaRDI QIDQ2106063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors E. Dokumaci, William H. Sandholm

Publication date 8 December 2022

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022006

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorystochastic stabilityBayesian gamesBayesian best response dynamicresidential segregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758785 (Why is no real title available?)
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
• Social dynamics

Cited in

(19)

• Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update
• An extension of Young's segregation game
• Schelling's model revisited: from segregation to integration
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
• A dynamical systems model of unorganized segregation
• An extension of Schelling's segregation model: modeling the impact of individuals' intolerance in the presence of resource scarcity
• Schelling segregation with strategic agents
• A family of models for Schelling binary choices
• Theoretical investigation on the Schelling's critical neighborhood demand
• Blockbusting: brokers and the dynamics of segregation
• A spatially extended model for residential segregation
• A piecewise smooth model of evolutionary game for residential mobility and segregation
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• House exchange and residential segregation in networks
• Avalanches in an extended Schelling model: an explanation of urban gentrification
• The role of constraints in a segregation model: the asymmetric case
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Characterizing segregation in the schelling-voter model

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