Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation

DOI10.3934/JDG.2022006zbMATH Open1505.91287OpenAlexW2182702235MaRDI QIDQ2106063FDOQ2106063

Authors: E. Dokumaci, William H. Sandholm 

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022006

Recommendations

• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• A piecewise smooth model of evolutionary game for residential mobility and segregation
• A Dynamic Model of Segregation in Small-World Networks
• Schelling segregation with strategic agents
• Schelling's model revisited: from segregation to integration

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorystochastic stabilityBayesian gamesBayesian best response dynamicresidential segregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social dynamics
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria

Cited In (19)

• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• A family of models for Schelling binary choices
• Characterizing segregation in the schelling-voter model
• Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update
• An extension of Young's segregation game
• A piecewise smooth model of evolutionary game for residential mobility and segregation
• The role of constraints in a segregation model: the asymmetric case
• A spatially extended model for residential segregation
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Schelling's model revisited: from segregation to integration
• A dynamical systems model of unorganized segregation
• Blockbusting: brokers and the dynamics of segregation
• Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
• Avalanches in an extended Schelling model: an explanation of urban gentrification
• Theoretical investigation on the Schelling's critical neighborhood demand
• Schelling segregation with strategic agents
• House exchange and residential segregation in networks
• An extension of Schelling's segregation model: modeling the impact of individuals' intolerance in the presence of resource scarcity

This page was built for publication: Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2106063)