Schelling segregation with strategic agents

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_13MaRDI QIDQ1617657zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor

Publication date 8 November 2018

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.08713

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchySchelling game, Schelling segregation model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Abstract: Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences. For our models, we investigate the convergence behavior and the efficiency of their equilibria. In particular, we prove guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium in the version which is closest to Schelling's original model. Moreover, we provide tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy.

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Cited in

(26)

• Schelling's model revisited: from segregation to integration
• Schelling games on graphs
• The impact of geometry on monochrome regions in the flip Schelling process
• Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation
• Altruism and fairness in Schelling's segregation model
• An extension of Young's segregation game
• Game theoretical interactions of moving agents
• A Dynamic Model of Segregation in Small-World Networks
• A piecewise smooth model of evolutionary game for residential mobility and segregation
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
• Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation
• Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games.
• Modified Schelling games
• Modified Schelling games
• Topological distance games
• A Schelling model with switching agents: decreasing segregation via random allocation and social mobility
• Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update
• Not all strangers are the same: the impact of tolerance in Schelling games
• Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games
• From selfishness \& altruism to macro-behavior
• Diversity-seeking jump games in networks
• Stable dinner party seating arrangements
• The parameterized complexity of welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation
• Network creation with homophilic agents
• One-sided markets with externalities
• Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation

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