Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games.
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Publication:5089176
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2020.15OpenAlexW3082784720MaRDI QIDQ5089176FDOQ5089176
Authors: D. Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor 
Publication date: 18 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02752
price of anarchynon-cooperative gamesgame dynamicsresidential segregationSchelling's segregation model
Cites Work
- Networks, crowds and markets. Reasoning about a highly connected world.
- Worst-case equilibria
- Potential games
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Dynamic models of segregation†
- Unperturbed Schelling segregation in two or three dimensions
- A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
- An analysis of one-dimensional Schelling segregation
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- Exponential segregation in a two-dimensional Schelling model with tolerant individuals
- Computing the complexity for Schelling segregation models
- Schelling segregation with strategic agents
- Nash stable outcomes in fractional hedonic games: existence, efficiency and computation
- Digital morphogenesis via schelling segregation
- Clustering and mixing times for segregation models on \(\mathbb{Z}^2\)
- Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation
Cited In (6)
- Modified Schelling games
- Not all strangers are the same: the impact of tolerance in Schelling games
- The parameterized complexity of welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation
- Welfare guarantees in Schelling segregation
- Schelling games on graphs
- The impact of geometry on monochrome regions in the flip Schelling process
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