Exponential segregation in a two-dimensional Schelling model with tolerant individuals
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Publication:4575802
Abstract: We prove that the two-dimensional Schelling segregation model yields monochromatic regions of size exponential in the area of individuals' neighborhoods, provided that the tolerance parameter is a constant strictly less than 1/2 but sufficiently close to it. Our analysis makes use of a connection with the first-passage percolation model from the theory of stochastic processes.
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