Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_12zbMath1435.91135arXiv1907.07513OpenAlexW2991414458MaRDI QIDQ776259

Marcus Pappik, Friedrich Schöne, Hagen Echzell, Tobias Friedrich, Louise Molitor, Pascal Lenzner, David Stangl, Fabian Sommer

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07513

zbMATH Keywords

potential gamesSchelling segregationcomputational hardnessconvergence of improving response dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Mathematical geography and demography (91D20)

Related Items (8)

Topological distance games ⋮ Not all strangers are the same: the impact of tolerance in Schelling games ⋮ Modified Schelling games ⋮ Topological Influence and Locality in Swap Schelling Games. ⋮ Schelling games on graphs ⋮ Convergence and hardness of strategic Schelling segregation ⋮ The impact of geometry on monochrome regions in the flip Schelling process ⋮ Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

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