Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.007zbMATH Open1347.91030OpenAlexW2258247485MaRDI QIDQ263380FDOQ263380

In-Uck Park, Massimo Morelli

Publication date: 5 April 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/17579

Recommendations

• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
• Stability of coalitions in a heterogeneous population

zbMATH Keywords

abilitiescyclic partitionnon-segregationstable systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Gamson's law and hedonic games
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Organization and inequality in a knowledge economy
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Formation of segregated and integrated groups

Cited In (3)

• Training, abilities and the structure of teams
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

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