A characterization of farsightedly stable networks

DOI10.3390/G1030226MaRDI QIDQ2344938zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030226

zbMATH Keywords

farsighted playersgroupwise deviationspairwise deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Review text

Summary: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with the unique groupwise myopically stable set of networks but not with the unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks. We conclude that, if groupwise deviations are allowed then whether players are farsighted or myopic does not matter; if players are farsighted then whether players are allowed to deviate in pairs only or in groups does not matter.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(10)

• Farsightedly stable networks
• Networks and farsighted stability
• Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
• Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
• Farsighted network formation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4139561 (Why is no real title available?)
• Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
• Competition and networks of collaboration
• Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
• A characterization of stochastically stable networks

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