A characterization of farsightedly stable networks
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Publication:2344938
DOI10.3390/g1030226zbMath1311.91166OpenAlexW2152382833MaRDI QIDQ2344938
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030226
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