Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability

DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0148-8zbMath1329.91064MaRDI QIDQ2254239

Gilles Grandjean

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/75261

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencynetworksrisk-sharingfarsighted agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research

Related Items

Stability of alliance networks

Cites Work

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