Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability
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Publication:2254239
DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0148-8zbMath1329.91064OpenAlexW2140892278MaRDI QIDQ2254239
Publication date: 4 February 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/75261
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)
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Cites Work
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