Equilibria and Systemic Risk in Saturated Networks
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Publication:5868935
DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1188zbMath1498.91481arXiv1912.04815OpenAlexW3207915841MaRDI QIDQ5868935
Leonardo Massai, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani
Publication date: 26 September 2022
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04815
Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)
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