Horizon-K farsightedness in criminal networks
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Publication:2669078
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Cites work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted network formation
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Networks and farsighted stability
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Social and economic networks.
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- The farsighted stable set
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
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