Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
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Publication:2051503
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00771-3zbMath1478.91039OpenAlexW3133296388MaRDI QIDQ2051503
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1509.pdf
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