Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
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Publication:926225
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0251-6zbMath1203.91022OpenAlexW1976597449MaRDI QIDQ926225
Bertrand Tchantcho, Roland Pongou, Lawrence Diffo Lambo
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0251-6
Related Items (8)
Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation ⋮ Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ Properties of ladder tournaments ⋮ A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority ⋮ A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games ⋮ On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS
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