A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0317-5zbMath1159.91011OpenAlexW1994059585MaRDI QIDQ957863

Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 1 December 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0317-5

zbMATH Keywords

coreimplementationvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Stability of voting games
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• A market to implement the core
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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