Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9347-YMaRDI QIDQ368059zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date 18 September 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationcoalition-free inducement relationsCSSBinvertible inducement relationsOSSBperfect foresight

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Stable cartels revisited
• Stable networks
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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(1)

• Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets

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