Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation
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Publication:368059
DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9347-yzbMath1273.91151MaRDI QIDQ368059
Publication date: 18 September 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y
coalition formation; coalition-free inducement relations; CSSB; invertible inducement relations; OSSB; perfect foresight
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