On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0403-7MaRDI QIDQ2268890zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou, Joël Moulen

Publication date 15 March 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0403-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Stability of voting games

Cites work

• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• A class of simple games
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Ternary voting games
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

Cited in

(16)

• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
• Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
• Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Bounds for the Nakamura number
• A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
• Some open problems in simple games
• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Criticality in games with multiple levels of approval
• The stability of multi-dimensional rules

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