Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms

DOI10.2307/2526379zbMATH Open0504.90005OpenAlexW2087414707MaRDI QIDQ4740293FDOQ4740293

Steven A. Matthews

Publication date: 1982

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526379

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesmajority rule gamevoting dynamicslocal gamedirectional coreconstrained voting equilibriumdirectional outcomePareto unanimity gamepublic choice mechanismsSchofield's null dual condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (3)

• Structural instability of the core
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

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