Some Generalizations of Social Decisions under Majority Rule

DOI10.2307/1913796MaRDI QIDQ4051826zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard E. Wendell, Stuart J. Thorson

Publication date 1974

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8ba467f9684c1d8ca59ced7d36e06297b6493868

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cited in

(12)

• Networks with Condorcet solutions
• How bad can a voting locating be
• New perspectives in competitive location theory
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Borda winner in facility location problems on sphere
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• Sequential competitive location on networks
• On condorcet and median points of simple rectilinear polygons
• The wisdom of voters: evaluating the Weber objective in the plane at the Condorcet solution
• Conditional Location Problems on Networks and in the Plane
• Foundations of spatial preferences

This page was built for publication: Some Generalizations of Social Decisions under Majority Rule

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4051826)