How bad can a voting locating be

DOI10.1007/BF00435663zbMath0602.90052OpenAlexW1969540509MaRDI QIDQ1082239

Hans-Jürgen Bandelt, Martine Labbé

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00435663

zbMATH Keywords

votingCondorcet pointWeber pointsgeneralized cactiSimpson pointsingle-facility location on networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Competitive location on a network ⋮ Comparison of Condorcet and Weber solutions on a plane: social choice versus centralization ⋮ Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems ⋮ Conditional Location Problems on Networks and in the Plane

Cites Work

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• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
• Networks with Condorcet solutions
• Outcomes of voting and planning in single facility location problems
• New perspectives in competitive location theory
• On locating new facilities in a competitive environment
• Algorithms for Voting and Competitive Location on a Network
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Some Generalizations of Social Decisions under Majority Rule
• Equivalence of Solutions to Network Location Problems
• Optimum Locations of Switching Centers and the Absolute Centers and Medians of a Graph

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