Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
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Publication:792856
DOI10.1007/BF01769816zbMath0537.90004MaRDI QIDQ792856
Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber
Publication date: 1984
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
coresocial choicevoting gamesbalanced gameswinning coalitionsmajority equilibriumnonemptiness result
Related Items (3)
How bad can a voting locating be ⋮ A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
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