Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium

DOI10.1007/BF01769816zbMATH Open0537.90004MaRDI QIDQ792856FDOQ792856

Authors: Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

coresocial choicevoting gamesbalanced gameswinning coalitionsmajority equilibriumnonemptiness result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives

Cited In (8)

• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Existence of a multicameral core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
• How bad can a voting locating be
• Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games

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