Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium

DOI10.1007/BF01769816MaRDI QIDQ792856zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber

Publication date 1984

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coresocial choicevoting gamesbalanced gameswinning coalitionsmajority equilibriumnonemptiness result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
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Cites work

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(8)

• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000142 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Existence of a multicameral core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4095248 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
• How bad can a voting locating be
• Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games

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