Spectrum value for coalitional games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011zbMath1282.91026MaRDI QIDQ2437810

Eyal Winter, Ziv Hellman, M. Álvarez-Mozos

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp618.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; coalitional games; restricted cooperation; political spectrum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91F10: History, political science

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Cites Work

• Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Oskar Morgenstern
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• Voting power in the European Union enlargement
• THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
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