Spectrum value for coalitional games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011zbMath1282.91026OpenAlexW1977085026MaRDI QIDQ2437810

Eyal Winter, Ziv Hellman, M. Álvarez-Mozos

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp618.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoalitional gamesrestricted cooperationpolitical spectrum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (5)

Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions ⋮ The effects of excluding coalitions ⋮ Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union ⋮ Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation

Cites Work

• Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Oskar Morgenstern
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• Voting power in the European Union enlargement
• THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
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