Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament

DOI10.1007/S10100-015-0406-7zbMath1344.91008OpenAlexW746399107MaRDI QIDQ314611

Elena Mielcová

Publication date: 16 September 2016

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-015-0406-7

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf power indexShapley-Shubik power indexpower distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Special issue of the Czech society for operations research ⋮ Modified indices of political power: a case study of a few parliaments ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union

Cites Work

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• Collusion properties of values
• Probabilistic spatial power indexes
• An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

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