Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament
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Publication:314611
DOI10.1007/S10100-015-0406-7zbMath1344.91008OpenAlexW746399107MaRDI QIDQ314611
Publication date: 16 September 2016
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-015-0406-7
Related Items (3)
Special issue of the Czech society for operations research ⋮ Modified indices of political power: a case study of a few parliaments ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
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