Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
From MaRDI portal
Publication:404775
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0786-3zbMATH Open1297.91058OpenAlexW2151790465MaRDI QIDQ404775FDOQ404775
Constantine S. Sorokin, A. V. Zakharov
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0786-3
Recommendations
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Nash equilibrium in multiparty competition with ``stochastic voters
- A theory of voting in large elections
Cites Work
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- A theory of voting in large elections
- Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
- Elections with platform and valence competition
Cited In (14)
- The binary policy model
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- Elections and strategic positioning games
- Vote-motivated candidates
- Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
- Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
- A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
- Alienation, indifference and the choice of ideological position
- A theory of voting in large elections
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
This page was built for publication: Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q404775)