ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING
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Publication:6088693
DOI10.1111/iere.12652zbMath1530.91502OpenAlexW4380791255MaRDI QIDQ6088693
Tridib Sharma, Romans Pancs, Andrei M. Gomberg
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12652
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