Partisan gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

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Publication:4611268

DOI10.1017/JPR.2018.70zbMATH Open1405.60058arXiv1712.05390OpenAlexW2772189032WikidataQ128580579 ScholiaQ128580579MaRDI QIDQ4611268FDOQ4611268


Authors: Boris Alexeev, Dustin G. Mixon Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 17 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Bizarrely shaped voting districts are frequently lambasted as likely instances of gerrymandering. In order to systematically identify such instances, researchers have devised several tests for so-called geographic compactness (i.e., shape niceness). We demonstrate that under certain conditions, a party can gerrymander a competitive state into geographically compact districts to win an average of over 70% of the districts. Our results suggest that geometric features alone may fail to adequately combat partisan gerrymandering.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05390




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