Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
From MaRDI portal
Publication:864884
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.004zbMath1153.91307OpenAlexW2164679170MaRDI QIDQ864884
John Duggan, Francesco Squintani, Dan Bernhardt
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-142748283
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