Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0306-ZMaRDI QIDQ733767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Haldun Evrenk

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-008-0333-9

zbMATH Keywords

local Nash equilibriumpure strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Intensity valence
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Local Political Equilibria
• Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets

Cites work

• Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model

Cited in

(7)

• Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions
• Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
• Local Political Equilibria
• Intensity valence

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