Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0306-ZzbMATH Open1183.91041OpenAlexW3121288114MaRDI QIDQ733767FDOQ733767

Haldun Evrenk

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-008-0333-9

Recommendations

• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Intensity valence
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Local Political Equilibria
• Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets

zbMATH Keywords

local Nash equilibriumpure strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
• Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case

Cited In (4)

• Local Political Equilibria
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model

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