Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
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Publication:2829690
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17zbMATH Open1348.91098OpenAlexW1628982882MaRDI QIDQ2829690FDOQ2829690
Franรงois Maniquet, Jean-Franรงois Laslier
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17
Cites Work
Cited In (3)
Recommendations
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ๐ ๐
- Approval voting in subset elections ๐ ๐
- Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences ๐ ๐
- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections ๐ ๐
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates ๐ ๐
- Approval elections with a variable number of winners ๐ ๐
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates ๐ ๐
- A simple characterization of approval voting ๐ ๐
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences ๐ ๐
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ๐ ๐
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