Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17zbMATH Open1348.91098OpenAlexW1628982882MaRDI QIDQ2829690FDOQ2829690

François Maniquet, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Deterministic observation: theory and applications
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

Cited In (3)

• Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
• Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
• Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization

Recommendations

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• Approval Voting in Large Electorates 👍 👎
• Approval elections with a variable number of winners 👍 👎
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates 👍 👎
• A simple characterization of approval voting 👍 👎
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences 👍 👎
• Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules 👍 👎

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