Recommendations
- Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism
- On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- The war of information
- Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
Cites work
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- A spatial theory of positive and negative compaigning
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Polarization and Inefficient Policies
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises
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