Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.05.001MaRDI QIDQ1885441zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Westermark

Publication date 28 October 2004

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82865

zbMATH Keywords

CampaigningPolitical parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism
• On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
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Cites work

• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• A spatial theory of positive and negative compaigning
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Polarization and Inefficient Policies
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises

Cited in

(2)

• The complexity of campaigning
• Ideological extremism and primaries

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