Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1885441
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.001zbMath1083.91050OpenAlexW1964316882MaRDI QIDQ1885441
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82865
Cites Work
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises
- A spatial theory of positive and negative compaigning
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Polarization and Inefficient Policies