A spatial theory of positive and negative compaigning
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Publication:1363538
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0103zbMATH Open0874.90059OpenAlexW2002916934MaRDI QIDQ1363538FDOQ1363538
Joseph E. jun. Harrington, Gregory D. Hess
Publication date: 10 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0103
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