Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game
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Publication:682487
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0988-6zbMATH Open1392.91136OpenAlexW1715153753WikidataQ59474290 ScholiaQ59474290MaRDI QIDQ682487FDOQ682487
Authors: Sourav Bhattacharya
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0988-6
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- How do Campaigns Shape Vote Choice? Multicountry Evidence from 62 Elections and 56 TV Debates
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
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- Contest with attack and defense: Does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?
- The war of information
- Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter
- Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
- Civic duty and political advertising
- Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
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