Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter
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Publication:1680115
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.002zbMath1415.91113OpenAlexW2539657243MaRDI QIDQ1680115
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.002
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