A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0021-xzbMath1102.91003OpenAlexW2164946539MaRDI QIDQ850883

Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

Publication date: 7 November 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0021-x

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationinformation revelationcostly signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Cheap talk and burned money
• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Long Cheap Talk

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