Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
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Publication:705857
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.002zbMath1085.91015OpenAlexW2059614097MaRDI QIDQ705857
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.002
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