Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games

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Publication:1412017

DOI10.1007/s00285-002-0194-2zbMath1097.91016OpenAlexW2061192659WikidataQ73401829 ScholiaQ73401829MaRDI QIDQ1412017

Emilia Sansone, Ilan Eshel

Publication date: 4 November 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-002-0194-2




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