How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2007.11.006zbMath1208.92053OpenAlexW2018589091WikidataQ51897222 ScholiaQ51897222MaRDI QIDQ615426

Jan Kozłowski, Krzysztof Argasinski

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsmortality ratedensity dependencelife history theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

The dynamics of sex ratio evolution. Dynamics of global population parameters ⋮ Nest site lottery revisited: towards a mechanistic model of population growth suppressed by the availability of nest sites ⋮ Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games ⋮ The nest site lottery: how selectively neutral density dependent growth suppression induces frequency dependent selection ⋮ Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
• Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolutionary games related to replicator dynamics. a metasimplex concept
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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