How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games
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Publication:615426
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2007.11.006zbMath1208.92053OpenAlexW2018589091WikidataQ51897222 ScholiaQ51897222MaRDI QIDQ615426
Jan Kozłowski, Krzysztof Argasinski
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2007.11.006
Related Items (5)
The dynamics of sex ratio evolution. Dynamics of global population parameters ⋮ Nest site lottery revisited: towards a mechanistic model of population growth suppressed by the availability of nest sites ⋮ Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games ⋮ The nest site lottery: how selectively neutral density dependent growth suppression induces frequency dependent selection ⋮ Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations
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- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolutionary games related to replicator dynamics. a metasimplex concept
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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