Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102863zbMath1521.91038OpenAlexW4378978260MaRDI QIDQ6114948

Rakesh V. Vohra, Akhil Vohra, Juuso Toikka

Publication date: 15 August 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102863

zbMATH Keywords

dualitymechanism designBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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