Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing

DOI10.1145/3313276.3316331zbMath1433.91078arXiv1811.00763OpenAlexW2962826553MaRDI QIDQ5212808

Yaonan Jin, Qi Qi, Pinyan Lu, Tao Xiao, Zhihao Gavin Tang

Publication date: 30 January 2020

Published in: Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00763

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationmathematical optimizationtight boundanonymous pricingoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (3)

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions

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