Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice

DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0571-0zbMATH Open1411.91128OpenAlexW2189457982MaRDI QIDQ1684129FDOQ1684129

Authors: Takashi Shimizu 

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0571-0

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zbMATH Keywords

voicecheap talkcredibilityexitinformativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Veto-based delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• A simple model of voice
• Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space

Cited In (4)

• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case
• Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space

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