Deception in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1007/S10670-014-9623-ZMaRDI QIDQ320155zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manolo Martínez

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9623-z

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesdeceptionGodfrey-SmithSkyrms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
• Receiver's dilemma
• Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

Cites work

• Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
• Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(4)

• Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication
• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4174720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Behavioural deception and formal models of communication

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Gambit

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