Deception in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1007/S10670-014-9623-ZzbMATH Open1346.91018OpenAlexW1989398536MaRDI QIDQ320155FDOQ320155

Authors: Manolo Martínez 

Publication date: 6 October 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9623-z

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zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesdeceptionGodfrey-SmithSkyrms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
• Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning

Cited In (2)

• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Uses Software

• Gambit

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