Persuading a pessimist: simplicity and robustness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.05.007MaRDI QIDQ2049474zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Afshin Nikzad

Publication date 25 August 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionBayesian persuasioninformation designinterval structuremonotone partitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Monotone persuasion
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Resisting persuasion
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Cites work

• Ambiguous persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(6)

• Can good news lead to a more pessimistic choice of action?
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
• Ambiguous persuasion: an ex-ante formulation
• Persuasion under ambiguity

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