Persuading a pessimist: simplicity and robustness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.05.007zbMath1470.91054OpenAlexW3172604981MaRDI QIDQ2049474

Afshin Nikzad

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionmonotone partitionsBayesian persuasioninformation designinterval structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

Cites Work

• Ambiguous persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach

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