Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union-Wide Ballot Requirements*
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Publication:3166563
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01664.xzbMath1248.91044OpenAlexW2128787918MaRDI QIDQ3166563
Publication date: 12 October 2012
Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01664.x
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Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A Model of Expertise
- Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
- Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining
- A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
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