A tree formulation for signaling games

DOI10.1155/2013/754398zbMath1305.91047OpenAlexW2052124855WikidataQ58920092 ScholiaQ58920092MaRDI QIDQ457861

Dionysius Glycopantis, Xeni Dassiou

Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/754398

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
• Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives
• Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• Radical semantics: A new theory of meaning
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Derandomization of auctions

This page was built for publication: A tree formulation for signaling games