A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
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Publication:423716
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.03.008zbMATH Open1239.91019OpenAlexW1964398705MaRDI QIDQ423716FDOQ423716
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008
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Cites Work
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- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
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- Long Cheap Talk
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Universal Mechanisms
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Can sunspots replace a mediator?
- Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
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