A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.03.008MaRDI QIDQ423716zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Blume

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

correlationcommunicationinformation transmissionlanguage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3852087 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Can sunspots replace a mediator?
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Long Cheap Talk
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Universal Mechanisms

Cited in

(7)

• \textit{simple} mediation in a cheap-talk game
• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• The value of mediated communication
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• A tree formulation for signaling games

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