A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008zbMath1239.91019OpenAlexW1964398705MaRDI QIDQ423716

Andreas Blume

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

correlationcommunicationlanguageinformation transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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